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WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

should be noted that in the instant case the photographs established the crime and
without them no conviction could have been had, indicating that the court was
adopting an unusually liberal view as to their admittance. Liberal use of photographs as substantive evidence rather than mere illustrative evidence has been
urged by textwriters 6 and law review authors.7 Those in favor of liberal use of
photographs in evidence point out that here is the perfect witness-"an eye-witness
who cannot forget and whose memory cannot be distorted."8 They also point out
that protection against "trick" photography lies not in rigid exclusory rules but
rather in careful qualification in preliminary examinations. According to these
authors two questions are to be met: (1) competency and (2) materiality and
relevancy. If the photograph is not an accurate, honest representation of the true
facts it is not competent and should he excluded. If the photograph is competent
then the question is whether it is a genuine aid to the jury in determining the
facts; i. e., is it material or relevant? If these two tests are met it then becomes
the most admissible type of evidence, entitled to the highest degree of credibility
9
because it is free of the usual and very human causes of testimonial error.
These arguments have a strong appeal, but there are pitfalls to consider.
Looking at the instant case it is seen that no one vouched for the authenticity of
the photographs and this fact in itself would cast doubt upon their worth. The
venue and time of the crime was established by the photographs of the interior
of the apartment; however, most metropolitan apartments are notoriously similar
in appearances and furnishings. These photographs could easily have represented
the interior of another apartment in another state at another time.
With the traditional safeguards and strong precedent in mind the majority
of the courts have been more restrictive than the instant case in admitting photographs into evidence. It is submitted that this case offers an argument for both
points of view as to the admission of photographs into evidence :-To those who
advocate liberality it represents a healthy trend :-To those who faver the traditional safeguards it points up the dangers of being too liberal. As is generally true
in such situations, the better view lies somewhere between the two extremes.
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LEGAL ADVICE By ACCOUNTANTS
Defendant, an accountant, was consulted by the Croft Co. as to whether
certain tax obligations to the state of New York attributable to business done in

6.
7.
8.
9.

the credibility of defendant.); Scott, Photographic Evidence, pp. 208-211
(1942) (Points out the possibility of catching criminals in the act by use
of photographs and refers to Commonwealth v. BrIetic, supra note 5, as
an illustration of this point. The author also mentions "planned pictures"
which are made by setting up automatic cameras to operate in connection
with burglar alarms to catch the criminal in the act. But no cases are
cited to cover such a situation since the criminal who is confronted with
such evidence would undoubtedly confess immediately).
3 Wigmore, Evidence See. 792a (Pocket Supplement, Rucker Ed. 1947);
Scott, Photographic Evidence, see. 601 (1942).
Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N. C. L. Rev. 233 (1946); 7 N. C.
L. Rev. 443 (1929).
24 N. C. L. Rev. 233, 235 (1946).
Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N. C. L. Rev. 233, 235, 236 (1946).
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the years 1935, 1936, and 1937, when the company had no taxable profits, could
be charged off as expense in 1943, when the company had large profits. Defendant made a research on the subject and advised the company that there was a case
similar to this problem in the company's favor. Defendant did not prepare the
company's tax return and did no work of any kind on their books. A lower court
dismissed the proceedings on the merits, but the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court here reverses and defendant was fined $50.00 and enjoined
from further illegal practice of law, the court reasoning that the question which
defendant undertook to answer was in the nature of a question of law, made evident by the nature of the research. Held that, if the question of law is such a
problem that an outside consultant, besides the regular accountant preparing the
tax return, must be called in to do legal research and to advise as to law none
too clear, that consultant must be a lawyer. Application of New York County
Lawyer's Jss'n. 78 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 209 (1st Dept. 1948).
The privilege of practicing law is strongly restricted to members of the bar,,
and the judicial department of government, and no other, has power to license
persons to practice law.2 The justification made by the courts for excluding from
the practice of law persons not admitted to the bar is to be found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department could exercise little control.3
Having the proposition that practice of law is illegal if by one other than a
member of the bar, what is "practice of law"? The courts have said repeatedly
that the judicial department is the sole arbiter of what constitutes the practice of
law.4 It is not easy to define the practice of law. An architect must know the
building laws to advise a client; an insurance agent must know the legal effect of
policies; and similarly with brokers, salesmen, and realtors. It is even more
difficult in the case of accountants to separate the tangled principles of accounting
and law. An accountant must understand the legal effects of statutes and decisions to properly prepare statements and tax returns.
Some definitions have been assayed, such as, "'Practicing as an attorney or
counselor at law, according to the customs of our courts, is the giving of advice
or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the
giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree
1. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 see. 2-418. "No person resident in the State of Wyoming shall practice law in the state of Wyoming except an active member
of the State Bar."
2. Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945 sec. 2-102. "All applications for admission to the
bar of the state shall be made by petition to the supreme court . . . ";
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943) ; In Re
Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 47 N. E. (2d) 12 (1943).
3. In Re Shoe Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, Inc., 295 Mass. 369, 3 N. E. (2d) 746
(1936).
4. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943); State ex
rel Hunter, Atty. Gen. v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N. W. 380 (1937); People
ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937),
cert. denied 302 U. S. 728 (1937).
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of legal knowledge or skill'."5 Another test often applied is whether the act performed requires legal technique, skill and training. 6 But when these tests are
applied to facts, they do not stand up. They are far too simplified for the confusion that actually exists.
A sharp line cannot be drawn between accountant and lawyer, but the
examination of statutes, judicial decisions, and departmental rulings for the
purpose of advising upon a question of law relative to taxation, and the rendering
of an opinion thereon, are a part of the practice of law in which only members of
the bar may engage.7 The courts are again agreed that it is not necessary for
illegal practice of law that an appearance in court be made. 8 Further, it has been
said that it is entirely the character of the act which determines, and not whether
any compensation has been given. 9
In the principal case, the court had no objection to the defendant's knowing
and using law, particularly tax law, and preparing books without taking every
question to a lawyer. They admit that a thorough and working knowledge of tax
law is elemental to the practice of accounting. They further admit that there is
an inevitable over-lapping of fields by both accountant and tax lawyer. The court
evolved, not a strict definition, but a working rule of thumb which can be applied
to fact situations with rational results. In short, they say that it is not the adequacy
or the accuracy of the advice given, nor is it an issue, but that the decisions must
rest on the nature of the services rendered and on whether they were inherently
legal or accounting services. Applying this rule to the facts, they held that an
accountant may serve in setting up or auditing books, or advising with respect to
the keeping of books and records, the making of entries therein and the handling of
transactions and the preparation of tax returns. Most naturally this work and
advice must take cognizance of the law and conform with the law, particularly the
tax law. The application of legal knowledge in such work, however, is only
incidental to the accounting functions. It is not expected or permitted of the
accountant, despite his knowledge or use of the law, to give legal advice which is
unconnected with accounting work. That is exactly what this defendant did.
There are no Wyoming cases concerning accountants, but the court has
denied the right to appear in court to non-resident attorneys,10 and censured the
drawing of wills by a law clerk as illegal practice of law, though they did dismiss
5. People ex rel Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stockyards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901, 907 (1931).
6. Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 Atl. 20 (1937); People ex rel Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 111. 346, 8 N. E. (2d) 941 (1937), cert. denied 302

U. S. 728 (1937).

7. Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943); Crawford, County Treasurer v. McConnell, 173 Okla. 520, 49 P. (2d) 551 (1935).
8. Land Title Ajbstract & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E.
650 (1934); State ex rel Johnson, Atty. Gen. v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 23
N. W. (2d) 720 (1946).
9. State ex rel Hunter, Atty. Gen. v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N. W. 380 (1937);
Grievance Committee of Bar of Texas, Twenty-First Congressional Dist.
v. Dean, 190 S. W. (2d) 126 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Contra: Paul v. Stanley,
168 Wash. 371, 12 P. (2d) 401 (1932); State v. Adair, 4 W. W. Harr. 585,
156 Atl. 358 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess 1922).

10. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 26 Wyo. 327, 184 Pac. 226 (1919).
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the complaint and refuse to grant an injunction, feeling that there was good faith,
and said that, because no one had warned the defendant before filing suit, his
actions did not warrant punitive action, and they felt confident that he would
refrain from future illegal practice.))
In determining whether a man is practicing law, his work for any particular
client or customer should be considered as a whole.1 2 An accountant may prepare
tax returns and answer incidental legal questions that arise in connection with
preparing tax returns, but may not be called in by a business or another accountant
to do nothing other than answer a legal question. The possible added inconvenience and expense of calling in a lawyer do not warrant a lessening of this
rule, for the considerations of public protection far outweigh these factors.) 3
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MEANING OF ACCIDENT IN

ACCIDENT INSURANCE

B.

HENDERSON

POLICIES

Plaintiff carried an accident insurance policy which provided that "Injury"
as used in the policy means bodily injury which is the sole cause of the loss and
which is effected solely through accidental means. Suicide was expressly excluded
from recovery under the policy. Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide by closing
all the windows and turning on the gas of her stove. She went to sleep and
awakened several hours later surprised to find herself still alive. She then turned
off the gas and attempted to light the pilot light. An explosion resulted which
injured her. She brought suit to recover under the insurance policy; Iowa District
Court allowed recovery and defendant appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court.
Held, affirmed, sufficient evidence that injury was the result of accidental means
to go to the jury. Comfort v. Continental Casualty Co., 34 N. W. (2d) 588
(Iowa 1948).
There has long been a dispute as to the meaning of the phrase "by accidental
means" as used in accident insurance policies. Two view have developed neither
of which is a clearly defined majority.1 One view takes the position that when the
means that caused the death or injury are exactly as the insured intended, the
means are not accidental, even though the result was unexpected and accidental. 2
The other view looks at the phrase from the layman's point of view and holds that
11. The State of Wyoming, ex rel Wyoming State Bar v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172,
156 P. (2d) 309 (1944).
12. Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N. J. Eq. 599, 53 A. (2d) 800 (Ch. 1947).
13. Application of New York County Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 209

(1st Dept. 1948).

1. See Note, 166 A. L. R. 469 (1947).
2. Horton v. Travelers Insurance Co., 45 Cal. App. 462, 187 Pac. 1070 (1920);
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Selden, 78 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 4th 1897); Husbands v. Indiana Tray. Ace. Ass'n, 194 Ind. 586, 133 N. E. 130 (1921);
Feder v. Iowa State Trav. Men's Ass'n, 107 Iowa 538, 78 N. W. 252 (1899) ;
Kendall v. Tray. Protective Ass'n of America, 87 Ore. 179, 169 Pac. 751
1918).

